

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED BY COMMISSION ON THE  
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES STATEMENT OF  
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CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD

**BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE:  
FOCUS ON READINESS, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT OF THE FUTURE NATIONAL  
GUARD AND RESERVES,  
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA  
WEDNESDAY, September 20, 2006**

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Good morning, Chairman Punaro and other distinguished guests. I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on readiness, training, and emergency preparedness as well as the California National Guard's role in the interagency approach in responding to natural disasters or acts of terrorism.

First I would like to make the distinction between readiness and preparedness. Readiness reflects the current ability of a military unit to deploy and complete the federal mission for which it is organized. Measuring the levels of readiness is well documented and directed by the policies and regulations of each service. Preparedness on the other hand, is the ability of the National Guard to leverage federal readiness into unique capabilities to support the state and nation in DSCA operations. While the two are inextricably linked, they must be considered as discrete capabilities.

The California National Guard found itself in a changed world after September 11, 2001. On that day, the ARNG had only been resourced to maintain a minimum level of readiness, but has responded willingly and unswervingly as if we had been resourced as a front line force all along. Since 9/11, we have deployed over 22,000 personnel

worldwide. Members of California National Guard have served with distinction and honor in all of the major theaters of operation. The California National Guard sent over 8,000 members to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. We fulfilled NATO peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and supplemented active duty forces in Europe, Korea, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to responding to the call for active service, we continue to fulfill our Partnership for Peace mission in Ukraine.

The California Air National Guard, Resourced at a somewhat higher level, has served as a critical partner in the success of the United States Air Force by deploying over 8,465 personnel in OCONUS missions. This represents over 700 OCONUS deployments since 9/11. Despite this increased federal OPSTEMPO, members of the CA ANG have 55 State emergency missions between 2000 and today. They have completed an additional 27 Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) missions. The CA ANG was vital in forming the air bridge for California's significant response to Hurricane Katrina and providing a security task force to the Joint Task Force. Even now, the Air National Guard is supporting the federal wild-land firefighting response with the use of C130 aircraft and MAFFS.

Of significance within the number of California Guard deployment for federal missions, both the ARNG and ANG have deployed more soldiers and airmen than their total membership, indicating that a many California National Guard members have responded to the call for deployment multiple times since 9/11.

The California National Guard, both Army and Air, have a long and distinguished history of preparedness. The size, and complexity, of the response community in California has matured to the point that the California National Guard responds to more DSCA missions than any other state. For example, on a single day earlier this month, while still meeting all federal mission requirements, the California National Guard responded to two aerial Search and Rescue missions and two wildfire suppression missions while concurrently providing troops to help secure our airports, assist law enforcement agencies with marijuana eradication, and to help the border patrol secure the border.

At the national level, the National Guard Bureau is closely monitoring each state to ensure each state retains structure and readiness in ten key capabilities within their federal structure. These include.

- 1. Aviation**
- 2. Engineering**
- 3. Civil Support Teams**
- 4. Security**
- 5. Medical**
- 6. Transportation**
- 7. Maintenance**
- 8. Logistics**
- 9. Command and Control**
- 10. Communications**

I am pleased to report that the California National Guard possesses all of these unit types and works continuously to maintain the readiness of all unit capabilities.

We are now in the process of developing plans to utilize these ten unit types to provide eighteen key response capabilities to support California or other states as needed. These response capabilities include:

- 1. Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government (COOP/COG)**
- 2. Responding to Pandemic Incident**
- 3. Providing Mass Care & Shelter**
- 4. Providing Search & Rescue, Air Ground, and Water**
- 5. Providing Mass Transportation, Personnel and Materiel**
- 6. Providing Security Operations**
- 7. Providing Mass Decontamination**
- 8. Providing Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration of both external forces and Displaced Personnel**
- 9. Establishing and Supporting Emergency Communications Networks**
- 10. Establishing Temporary Medical Facilities**
- 11. Supporting Fire Fighting Operations**

- 12. Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction**
- 13. Supporting Mass Casualty Operations**
- 14. Supporting Quarantine Support Operations**
- 15. Providing Mass Distribution Operations**
- 16. Providing Imagery Support**
- 17. Providing Explosives Ordinance Disposal**
- 18. Conducting Critical Infrastructure Assessment**

These 18 response capabilities fill a critical gap in the responder community, and are rapidly becoming a key asset to the overall response plans of each state. These capabilities, planned, developed, trained and integrated into local response plans is the exponential force multiplier offered the state through improved readiness of the National Guard.

All military forces are charged to maintain readiness. It is the unique ability of the National Guard to translate readiness into preparedness at the responder level that creates the extended value of the reserve component to the citizens of the states and nation. The National Guard of each state is linked to the responder communities, often by virtue of residing in the same state agency, but always through constant and detailed communication, coordination, and planning.

The National Guard provides linkages between readiness and preparedness, between DoD and the state government, and between communities, first responders and local and federal authorities. It is critical that this commission, in its' deliberations and recommendations, make every effort to maintain and strengthen those linkages. To that end, I would suggest (three) key outcomes:

1. The Congress needs to enact the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. This means placement of National Guard and Reserve issues on a priority commensurate with the operational demands on the Guard. It is imperative that the Guard have a seat at the table to influence decisions on behalf of the Army and Air National Guard.
2. The control of the National Guard during emergencies MUST rest with the Governor and the current move (Section 511 of the Defense Authorization

Bill) to empower the President to federalize National Guard members during a “serious natural or man-made disaster, accident or catastrophe that occurs in the United States”....without prior consultation with the Governor. This means the inherent and habitual relationship that exist between the National Guard and the emergency response community within the states are severed by an unwarranted expansion of federal authority. Additionally, the flexibility that exists within the National Guard during emergency operations permits a unique response that can not be replicated by Title 10 forces.

3. The Readiness of the Guard must be brought on par across the two components, with the resourcing of the ARNG reflecting the levels of operations demonstrated over the past 5 years rather than that of the cold war era when the Guard was considered a strategic reserve. This means funding the replacement of equipment not returned from deployment, concurrent deployment of systems to the Guard and Active Force, Increased resources for recruiting, retention, training, and full time manning. It is through maintaining optimal readiness that the Guard can maintain the most effective preparedness.

As I stated earlier, I appreciate the opportunity to address this commission on this critical topic of readiness, training, and equipment of the future National Guard and Reserves. If I were to summarize my points here today, it is that the Guard, although never resourced as such, quickly became an expeditionary force and moved from strategic reserve to fully deployed and continues to serve with distinction. There are critical shortfalls that must be addressed at the federal level if the Guard is to remain the nations only truly dual-capability force.

I would encourage this commission to strengthen our ability to maintain readiness while not adversely impacting our ability to maintain preparedness. As I said at the outset, Readiness and Preparedness are absolutely linked, but the responsibility for each is discrete. The federal government is responsible for prioritizing and resourcing our readiness. It is the responsibility of the National Guard in each state to

translate resourcing into readiness and also preparedness. The guard will be the first military responder to any emergency or event, it is the guard that coordinates with and trains with the local responders, it is the guard that represents each and every community that might be effected, and it is the guard that is best prepared to translate readiness into the preparedness most needed for that community or state.

By addressing the (three) recommendations above, we can, collectively and collaboratively, leverage the unique capabilities of the National Guard to meet both the federal readiness requirements and the state preparedness needs to respond to what ever the need may arise.

Thank you.